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ABSTRACT
PRNU based camera recognition method is widely studied in the image forensic literature. In recent
years, CNN based camera model recognition methods have been developed. These two methods
also provide solutions to tamper localization problem. In this paper, we propose their combina-
tion via a Neural Network to achieve better small-scale tamper detection performance. According
to the results, the fusion method performs better than underlying methods even under high JPEG
compression. For forgeries as small as 100×100 pixel size, the proposed method outperforms the
state-of-the-art, which validates the usefulness of fusion for localization of small-size image forg-
eries. We believe the proposed approach is feasible for any tamper-detection pipeline using the
PRNU based methodology.
Keywords PRNU · CNN · Neural Network · source camera · identification · source camera verification · verification ·
digital forensics
1 Introduction
Digital images forgeries have become increasingly common in social media, causing a reduction of confidence in
media found on the Internet. Because of this, many methods have been developed to detect tampered images, including
the use of the Photo-Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) noise based Source Camera Verification (SCV) [1]. PRNU
based SCV works with a PRNU camera fingerprint which is first computed from multiple still images known to be
taken by a specific camera. Then, the PRNU noise extracted from a query image is correlated with this fingerprint to
determine if it was taken with the given camera. PRNU based SCV has been applied for tamper detection by matching
the camera fingerprint on a block by block basis with the query image. Blocks within a tampered region of the query
image will have a low correlation with the fingerprint as opposed to blocks that have not been tampered.
Since SCV is based on a correlation operation, using PRNU for tamper detection can be challenging when the tampered
region is small, especially in textured regions. There have been many approaches that have been developed to address
these challenges. One such technique assumes the existence of a linear relation between image content and PRNU
similarity and applies it on each image block to predict correlation values [2]. Tampering is then detected based on a
significant deviation of the actual correlation from the predicted value. Another approach focuses on changes to the
denoising filter and the denoiser output [3, 4], citing the deficiencies of the denoiser that prevent tamper detection.
Some other notable attempts included refining the detector output by applying segmentation [5], statistical methods to
improve the localization map [6], and multi-scale strategies [7] to improve localization performance.
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The media forensics community has recently started to incorporate deep learning techniques, especially CNN (Convo-
lutional Neural Network) based methods to solve media forensics problems. For example, in [8], a multi-scale CNN
model was used to detect and localize forged regions. In [9], a CNN based method for detecting forged regions from
small image blocks was proposed. Also, in [10, 11], a method for source Camera Model Identification (CMI) using
CNN was proposed and in [12] a universal manipulation detector using CNN was presented. However, this type of
detectors require vast amounts of data for training, which may not be available in most cases and are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks [13].
Unlike SCV which is often less than effective with small tampered regions [1, 7], CNN based techniques have been
shown to perform well on tampered regions as small as 64 × 64 pixels [9].Such CNN based techniques, as we show
later, do not perform well under high compression, and PRNU based techniques do not perform well when tampered
regions are with small size (e.g. 100 × 100). However, it is intuitively clear that SCV and CMI are really exploiting
different aspects of an image. SCV is based on device specific characteristics that is confined to the sensor array. CMI,
on the other hand, attempts to capture all the processing in the camera pipeline after the image is captured. And while
the former is robust to image processing operations, the latter is effective even when presented with smaller regions of
an image. In this paper, we leverage the strengths of both these approaches with the proposed method. We extensively
compare the performance of SCV, CMI, and the proposed method in the assessment of the integrity of small image
blocks (96× 96 pixels).
The proposed method, which we call the “Fusion” method, applies SCV and CMV on a block by block basis and fuses
the results of the two using a neural network, to detect and localize image tampering. The performance of the proposed
method is compared with the two methods in [6, 7] and is shown to yield better results with smaller forgery regions.
2 Background
The Fusion method incorporates traditional PRNU based SCV along with CNN based CMI, which was created from
scratch albeit with inspirations from the literature. The following sub-sections briefly introduce these methods and
outline their usage within the proposed method.
2.1 PRNU based Source Camera Verification
PRNU based SCV makes use of a noise pattern called Photo-Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) noise. The PRNU
noise pattern F is caused by the variations in photo-sites response to intensity of light I0, which occurs due to incon-
sistencies inherent in sensor manufacturing process. The pattern is found to be unique for each camera sensor and
it is detectable from digital images produced by digital cameras [14]. Other than PRNU, there is also random noise,
denoted with Γ.
Following the simple imaging sensor output model in [14] with matrix notation: I = I0 + I0F + Γ that incorporates
both types of noises, the pattern F can be estimated with a set of noise estimates N1, ..., NK, and a denoiser, which is
commonly referred as a Wavelet denoiser [15], s.t. N = I − denoiser(I). Using these noise estimates, estimating the
PRNU noise pattern of a camera’s sensor Fˆ can be computed using the MLE estimator in [14]. Verifying the source
camera of a query image Iq then only requires a Wavelet noise estimate Nq of this image and the MLE-estimated
PRNU pattern, Fˆ with normalized cross correlation ρ = corr(Nq, IqFˆ ) or with peak-to-correlation-energy (PCE)
formulation which applies some notable modifications [14] to normalized cross correlation.
2.2 CNN based Camera Model Identification
CNN consists of cascaded layers, which makes it useful to extract specific features from input images. In the convolu-
tion layer, the input data has the resolution of WI× HI× DI (from now on, W denotes width, H height, and D depth)
is convolved with a kernel with resolution WK× HK× DK , which is initialized with random weights at the beginning
and a specified value of stride. This operation produces a convolution map as the output. After the convolution layer,
activation function such as Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) is applied to avoid linearity.
In this work, the input data resolution WI× HI× DI is selected as 96×96×3, the kernel size WK× HK is selected as
3×3 and max(0,x) function is used as the ReLU activation function as shown in Fig. 2. The pooling layer carries out
down-sampling operation to produce smaller feature maps. The fully connected (FC) layer carries out a dot product
between the input feature vector and randomly initialized filter vector. Class scores are also produced in the FC layer.
Softmax layer carries out class scores coming from FC to probability scores so that the sum of all scores becomes 1.
In the CNN literature, many algorithms are used for updating kernel weights. We use the most common one, the
stochastic gradient descent algorithm. To train the CNN for camera model identification (CMI), we feed it with
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images from different camera models and labels referencing to the class of the images. As we want this CNN network
to generate probability scores for two classes, i.e. “target camera model” (H1) and “other camera model” (H0), for
each camera model. If an image from a different camera model is given to the CNN, then it would compute a higher
probability for other class, H0.
3 Proposed Method
CNN based CMI (Method 1) basically distinguishes camera models according to the interpolation feature of the
camera. Using small size blocks (≤250) as input allows it to detect small-size copy-paste forgeries. PRNU-based
SCV (Method 2), on the other hand, recognizes the source camera, based on the stationary features of the camera
sensor. Detection of tampered regions is also possible with Method 2. However, as resolution of the selected input
window decreases, performance also decreases. We propose to combine (fuse) these two methods that can work better
than each method individually. We expect that since Method 1 and Method 2 contain statistically different information,
it will give a more reliable result when combined.
Image 
Block Neural Network
Camera X CNN model
Camera X PRNU Fingerprint
Prob( Cam X / Block )
correlation coefficient
CNN class probabilityTest
Image
96x96x3 
pixels
ρ
x
φ
θ
x
x
CNN based CMI
PRNU based SCV
Figure 1: Block Diagram for Fusion Method Approach
Method 1 produces probability value as an output. Method 2 produces correlation between fingerprint and noise of
image block. A simple NN network has been created to weight these two outputs at the best rate. Briefly, output
information from Method 1 and Method 2 are given as input to NN.(Fig. 1)
In order to use the Fusion method, we assume that we have the model information and the PRNU fingerprint of the
device. This way, we can apply both methods and produce a single outcome through the NN.
Following steps are repeated for each input image block.
1. Obtain the probability value output from CNN based CMI (Method 1),
2. Compute the correlation value from the PRNU based SCV (Method 2),
3. Combine the correlation value (from Method 1) with the probability value (from Method 2) using the pro-
posed NN.
For the first step, the CNN network is trained using 96× 96 pixel image blocks. After training, the network is able to
produce probability value φ for the target camera class H1
In the second step, correlation value ρ, between PRNU noise in same image blocks from the first step, and their
corresponding PRNU fingerprint blocks are calculated.
In the third step, we combine the above two outcomes (ρ and φ). To do so, a neural network (NN) was trained which
gets the values of ρ and φ as input and produces a probability score for the existence of a forgery. This way, we can
generate a decision map by sliding over the image 96× 96 pixels block at a time with a small amount of shift.
4 Dataset and Experimental Setup
The Vision dataset in [16], was preferred in this study since it has images from 29 different contemporary camera
models. For each camera model, we used images labeled as "flat" and "nat" (as natural). Though there are 29 models
in total, 17 camera models of 21 devices were used in this study (Table 1). Only one device was used from each
camera model for training operations as a target camera. The additional four devices were used to evaluate small
3
A PREPRINT - FEBRUARY 25, 2020
Label Make Model Resolution
C1 Samsung S3 Mini 2560×1920
C2 Apple iPhone 4s 3264×2448
C3 Huawei P9 3969×2976
C4 LG D290 3264×2448
C5 Apple iPhone 5c 3264×2448
C6 Samsung Tab3 2048×1536
C7 Apple iPhone 4 2592×1936
C8 Samsung Galaxy S3 3264×2448
C9 Sony-Xperia Z1 Compact 5248×3936
C10 Apple iPad2 960×720
C11 Huawei P9 Lite 4160×3120
C12 Microsoft Lumia 640 LTE 3264×1840
C13 Apple iPhone 6 Plus 3264×2448
C14 Apple iPad Mini 2592×1936
C15 Wiko Ridge 4G 3264×2448
C16 Samsung Trend Plus 2560×1920
C17 One Plus A3000 4640×3480
Table 1: The cameras used in the experiments.
forgery localization performance against different devices of the same model, which is explained in Section 5.3. A
total of 160 nat images were used per device in all experiments (Table 2). 100 of these nat images were used only in
CNN training/testing, and up to 50 images from the remaining nat images were separated for NN training and method
comparison. The rest (10 images) were used for determining the optimum F-score threshold value for comparison
with the other methods in Section 6. Let us denote these 10 images as the set F . All the image sets were mutually
exclusive, in other words, no data was used more than once in any image set throughout this experiment.
CNN Training/
Testing
NN Training/
Method Comp.
Threshold
Decision
Label # Label # Label #
Ctr 80 Str 40 - -
Cts 20 Sts 10 - -
C 100 S 50 F 10
Table 2: Image sets used in experiments for target camera. Here, # denotes number of images in image sets.
4.1 CMI Setup (Method 1)
For CNN training, blocks of size 96× 96 pixels were extracted randomly from each image from two classes, s.t. 500
blocks from images within the target (correct) class, and 50 blocks from images within the other class.
Input Block
96x96x3
94x94x32
47x47x32
45x45x64
22x22x64
20x20x128
10x10x128
8x8x256
4x4x256
2x2x512
1x512 1x2
Fully Connected Layer Softmax3x3 Convolutional Layer Batch Normalization 2x2 Pooling, Stride:2 RELU Dropout rate 50%
    Class 
Probabilities
Figure 2: CNN model used in camera model classifier
The number of blocks we used for the CNN are given in Table 3, where Ctr and Cts denote the sets of images used for
training and testing respectively, whereas the numbers show the number of image blocks in each set used.
In the related literature, simple models are shown to produce successful results [17]. Our preliminary experiments
showed CNN models with small kernel sizes perform better than larger kernels for CMI. For this reason we inspired
by VGG [18], which employs a small size kernel filter. We experimented with different hyper-parameters and layer
structures and settled with the architecture that gave the best performance, as shown in Fig. 2. The CNN network was
trained for each of the 20 camera models. The training phase was stopped after 50 epochs.
4
A PREPRINT - FEBRUARY 25, 2020
# of Images # of Blocks
Set
Name
Target
Camera
Other
Camera
Target
Camera
Other
Camera
Ctr 80 1280 40k 64k
Cts 20 320 10k 16k
C 100 1700 50k 80k
Table 3: The data used in the CMI setup. Blocks refer to 96 × 96 pixels worth image patches used in CNN training
and test phases
4.2 SCV Setup (Method 2)
For each camera model, the PRNU fingerprint was estimated using all of the available flat images. Each camera had
at least 70 flat images. We used the PRNU method as described in [14]. Please note that PRNU noise of the image
blocks used here were cropped from the PRNU noise extracted from the full image.
Image blocks in the set Sts were used for performing PRNU based source camera identification. To ensure fairness,
the image blocks in the Sts set were used for comparison. However, as the performance of image noise extraction
algorithms get worse for small image regions, we avoid extracting the noise from the image blocks in Sts, and estimated
PRNU noise N from whole images.
These noise estimates were then cropped from the identical coordinates of each 96 × 96 pixel image blocks in set
Sts. Then, they were correlated with the PRNU fingerprint blocks extracted from the identical coordinates of the
corresponding camera PRNU fingerprints.
Some of the images placed in the set Sts were found to produce unexpectedly lower-than-threshold PRNU similarity
(50 in terms of PCE) values against their matching PRNU fingerprints. We attributed such outcomes to possible
mistakes in the dataset labels. For this reason, the image blocks from these images were excluded from the set S.
CNN PRNU
CNN PRNU
NN
NN
Training
Testing

  
Flat 
  

  

  

  

  
Figure 3: Illustration of image sets used during the training and testing phases.
4.3 Combining CMI and SCV outcomes
The Fusion method comprises 3 steps in total. First, the probability value was acquired from the CNN classifier, then
the correlation value from the PRNU method was computed and lastly, the NN part is trained to combine these two
and produces the final probability value. Therefore, the third step forms the actual output of the Fusion method.
We construct a simple artificial NN using ρ (from PRNU) and φ (from CNN classifier) values obtained from the Str,
which includes the image blocks corresponding to H1 and the H0 cases. Therefore the NN can learn from both the
matching (H1) and the non-matching (H0) cases.
For the NN, the number of blocks we used is denoted by Sts and Str for the number of training blocks and testing
blocks as shown in Table 4.
Let us denote each RGB image block in Str and Sts, by its source, i.e. the source coordinates (i, j) and the index of
the source image (k) with the symbol Bijk, the corresponding PRNU noise with Nijk. Similarly, the PRNU fingerprint
estimate of camera x for the same coordinates is denoted by F xij . These are then used to generate ρijk, as expressed in
the Eq. (2). The CNN tests, on the other hand, generates the φijk values in (1). Also, in the Eq. (1), CNNmodelx term
refers to model learned from the CNN training of camera x and fCNN refers to the CNN based CMI function.
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CNN # of AUC Values on set StsLabel Acc. Blocks
on Cts | Sts |/| Str | PRNU CNN Fusion
C1 92% 13.9k / 55.6k 0.97 0.96 0.99
C2 80% 14.5k / 58k 0.95 0.92 0.99
C3 95% 10.8k / 43.2k 0.91 0.99 0.99
C4 94% 14.2k / 56.8k 0.95 0.98 0.99
C5 93% 13.7k / 54.8k 0.99 0.96 0.99
C6 97% 13k / 52k 0.98 0.96 0.99
C7 97% 14.5k / 58k 0.98 0.99 0.99
C8 94% 14.5k / 58k 0.98 0.98 0.99
C9 99% 14.5k / 58k 0.99 0.99 0.99
C10 85% 14.5k / 58k 0.94 0.96 0.98
C11 96% 10.6k / 42.4k 0.97 0.99 0.99
C12 95% 14.5k / 58k 0.96 0.99 0.99
C13 89% 14.5k / 58k 0.98 0.94 0.99
C14 85% 13.5k / 54k 0.99 0.91 0.99
C15 92% 14.5k / 58k 0.98 0.99 0.99
C16 85% 14.5k / 58k 0.95 0.97 0.99
C17 95% 12k / 48k 0.99 0.98 0.99
Table 4: The performance of underlying methods. Accuracy values are denoted with (“Acc”). The AUC values
from the CNN network have been obtained from set Cts and the AUC values were calculated from their ROC’s. Sts
represents the amount of blocks in the test image set, whereas Str represents the amount of blocks in the training image
set.
φijk = fCNN(Bijk,CNNmodel
x) (1)
ρijk = corr(Nijk, BijkF
x
ij ) (2)
In our experiments, we find that the model performs best with 2 hidden layers and 10 nodes for each hidden layer. ρ
and φ values, obtained from Str, were used for the NN training and the learned model will be denoted by NNmodelx.
Thus, when Bijk is given as an input to fNN, the neural network function, the probability of tampering for a given
Bijk, denoted by θijk is produced Eq. (3).
θijk = fNN(ρijk, φijk,NNmodel
x) (3)
5 Results and Discussion
In this section, we provide results of the proposed method in different settings. and compare results with benchmarks
using two different methods in the literature.
5.1 Receiver Operating Characteristics of the Proposed Method
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed Fusion method against its underlying methods to quantify
the improvement for tamper detection. To test the NN performance, the correlation value ρijk, and the class probability
φijk values are obtained from image blocks Bijk s.t. Bijk ∈ Sts. Then the performance metrics, Area Under the Curve
(AUC) and ROC for each camera model were calculated using the outputs in Eqs. (1, 2 and 3). These metrics were
calculated by counting the number of matching blocks and non-matching blocks for various threshold values, in the
range of [-1,1] for the SCV output and [0,1] for the CMI and Fusion output.
Using the same blocks, the same performance metrics were also calculated with the PRNU and the CNN methods.
The AUC values are given in Table 4.
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5.2 Robustness under JPEG Compression
In our previous experiments, the Fusion method achieved high performance against small blocks from original images.
However, it’s not clear how well the proposed method would perform with compressed test samples. In this subsection,
we provide results to evaluate the robustness of the Fusion method against compression.
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
JPEG Quality Factor
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
Av
er
ag
e 
AU
C
CNN
PRNU
Fusion
Figure 4: The average AUC values for various JPEG quality factors
To do so, we reuse the previous experiment setup, with only one small modification: the image blocks in Sts were
extracted from images compressed with 5 different JPEG quality factors.
It is known in the literature that the PRNU method is robust against JPEG compression. However, the same cannot be
said for the CNN based CMI method as shown in Fig. 4. On images re-compressed with JPEG at various quality levels,
Fusion worked reasonably well, in line with PRNU method. According to the results in Fig. 4, the Fusion method
performed better than both the CNN based CMI and the PRNU based SCV at all compression rates, and reached an
average of 23% improvement against CNN based CMI on images with the highest compression rate.
5.3 Usability of pre-trained camera models
Employing the proposed method in current tamper-detection schemes only incurs initial computation costs for un-
known camera models. Thus, in other words, only new camera models (not existed in a database) need to be trained
through the CNN and NN outlined in this paper.
Recall that in the previous sections, experiments with Fusion were conducted on images strictly coming from one
device for each model. In this section, we evaluate the performance of the Fusion with images from new devices
with the same models where we already have NN and CNN models. Although CNN models are only camera-model-
specific, the NN model is trained with device-specific correlation map, which may cause it to become device-specific
as well. These additional devices and their models are given in Table 5. The test results show how the Fusion method
would perform when the training device and the test device are different, but sharing the same model. The results show
that the CNN based CMI and the NN models work successfully for images from another device of the same camera
model. As long as we have a PRNU fingerprint of a device of a known camera model, the proposed method can be
used for tamper detection regardless of the source camera device.
Note, that the number of test images and the number of blocks were the same as in Section 5.1. For each device in the
Table 5, Sts was created and the tests were performed on this set.
6 Tamper Detection Benchmarks
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed method against other PRNU based tamper detection
methods in the literature.
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Device Camera AUC Values on set Sts
Label Model PRNU CNN Fusion
C2,Dev-2 iPhone 4s 0.965 0.855 0.982
C5,Dev-2 iPhone 5c 0.959 0.837 0.976
C5,Dev-3 iPhone 5c 0.916 0.902 0.976
C1,Dev-2 S3 Mini 0.962 0.939 0.984
Table 5: The details of the selected same camera models with different devices and their respective AUC values using
the pre-trained models. The AUC values were calculated from ROC’s. (Dev: Device)
6.1 Methods
For benchmarking tamper detection rates, we selected two publicly released PRNU based tamper detection methods.
The first one was the multi-scale fusion (which will be denoted as “MSF” from now on) strategy in [7, 19]. Briefly,
this method produces heat-maps using the standard PRNU method through different window sizes. These heat-maps
are then fused using Conditional Random Fields (CRF) thus producing binary-maps. Since each heat-map is made
from windows of different sizes, smaller windows-sizes are more suitable for detecting smaller tampered regions, and
similarly, larger window-sizes are better for larger tampered regions. Therefore, compared to the standard PRNU
method, this method can produce better true positive and false positive rates.
The other method used for comparison was the Bayesian-MRF method in [6]. This method, (denoted as “MRF” )
replaces the constant false alarm rate with the Bayesian rule, uses BM3D non-local filtering instead of a Wavelet-
based filter, and uses Markovian priors to model spatial dependencies of the image to provide better detection rate
over the standard PRNU method.
Training for both methods was done using full images from the set Ctr while CNN training of Fusion was done using
blocks from the image set shown in Table 3. As all the three methods make use of PRNU fingerprint estimates, the
same set of flat images were used to compute these estimates for each device.
6.2 Determining the Decision Threshold
We look for a decision threshold value to create a binary map of the output of the Fusion method for each camera
model. We carry out this by measuring the F-score values, over a set of tampered images. The tampered images were
generated using the image set F , which consists of 10 images which were not used in any experiments.
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(a) C5: iPhone 5c
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(b) C11: P9 Lite
Figure 5: The average F-score measurements used for determining the threshold for two example camera models. In
the Figures, the threshold values which gives the maximum average F-score is selected as the decision threshold with
the Fusion method and highlighted with the red marker. The horizontal axis represents the threshold values, whereas
the vertical axis represents the F-score values.
We applied 100 threshold values in the range of [0-1], and applied morphological opening operation through disc
kernel with fixed-size (20px) radius on the binary map. Using the ground-truth for each tampered image, we then
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measured the F-score values. The F-score was computed with the following:
F-score =
2× TP
2× TP + FP + FN (4)
where in Eq. 4, TP stands for true positive, FP for false positive and FN for false negative. This way, we end up
having 30 different F-score measurements (3 tampered region sizes for each image is set F) for all threshold values.
The F-score measurements are then averaged and the threshold value producing the best F-score value in Eq. 4 was
selected as the threshold for each camera model. The averaged F-score measurements and the determined decision
threshold values for two example cameras can be seen in Fig. 5.
Tampered Region Size (pixels)
400×400 200×200 100×100
Label Fusion MRF MSF Fusion MRF MSF Fusion MRF MSF
C1 0.60 0.52 0.71 0.33 0.27 0.46 0.12 0.03 0.07
C2 0.53 0.41 0.51 0.41 0.30 0.33 0.18 0.09 0.07
C3 0.64 0.16 0.39 0.38 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00
C4 0.86 0.42 0.64 0.72 0.23 0.44 0.56 0.05 0.22
C5 0.69 0.75 0.84 0.58 0.58 0.69 0.20 0.07 0.13
C6 0.87 0.73 0.56 0.73 0.47 0.50 0.30 0.16 0.19
C7 0.92 0.69 0.82 0.83 0.51 0.69 0.31 0.16 0.36
C8 0.64 0.78 0.81 0.52 0.59 0.66 0.13 0.29 0.26
C9 0.86 0.53 0.88 0.75 0.35 0.73 0.58 0.03 0.23
C10 0.79 0.76 0.82 0.52 0.52 0.67 0.07 0.32 0.44
C11 0.57 0.48 0.55 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.07 0.00 0.01
C12 0.81 0.49 0.79 0.62 0.26 0.53 0.36 0.05 0.14
C13 0.67 0.49 0.57 0.45 0.29 0.43 0.19 0.15 0.15
C14 0.71 0.51 0.81 0.38 0.21 0.37 0.03 0.03 0.02
C15 0.83 0.76 0.77 0.70 0.62 0.65 0.48 0.38 0.30
C16 0.59 0.54 0.70 0.41 0.34 0.55 0.21 0.11 0.15
C17 0.75 0.33 0.53 0.53 0.10 0.31 0.13 0.02 0.16
Avg 0.73 0.57 0.70 0.56 0.38 0.53 0.26 0.13 0.19
Table 6: The F-scores from the benchmarks, w.r.t. to tampered region sizes. Camera details were given in Table
4. MSF represents the Multi-Scale Fusion method [7, 19], MRF represents the Bayesian-Markovian Random Fields
method in [6]. Avg. have been calculated with F-score values from all tested images.
6.3 Comparison
The methods were tested with the images from Sts which, to recall, included 154 images across all camera devices.
Note that this image set was used only for testing purposes, and no image in this set was included in any training
phase of any method we compared. To evaluate tamper detection performance, we created copy-paste forgeries with
the following sizes: 400×400, 200×200 and 100×100 pixels and saved each of these images with the lossless format
(PNG) leading to 462 tampered images. On average, 25 images per device were tested. Please note that for the Fusion,
the same morphological treatment in Section 6 was applied on threshold-applied probability maps before computing
the F-score values.
In order to make the comparison fair, a window-size of 96×96 pixels was chosen for the MRF method to be in line with
the Fusion approach (which uses 96×96). However, as the MSF method inherently utilized multiple window-sizes, for
MSF, we used the following 7 different sizes: 32×32, 48×48, 64×64, 96×96, 128×128, 192×192, 256×256 pixels
as stated in [7]. This may seem to be advantageous for the MSF method, as it has the advantage of utilizing more
heat-maps, however, we believe adhering to the literature will lead to a more objective comparison. In Fig. 8, 7 and 6,
one tampered image for each camera model are shown for various tampered region sizes.
In Table 6, the average F-score values for each method are provided. As seen in the Table, The proposed Fusion
method performed better for all tampered region sizes. Overall, on 51 test cases (from 17 cameras and 3 different
tampered region sizes) we tested, the Fusion method was the best performing in 34 cases, whereas for MSF there were
15 such cases and for MRF there were 2 such cases.
On experiments with the largest tampered region size setting, MSF worked best in terms of leading-cases (denoted
with bold characters in Table 6), however, it is behind the Fusion method with 7% in terms of F-scores. We believe
the multi-scale strategy employed by the MSF increased its advantage within this setting. Furthermore, there are few
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Figure 6: Examples with tampered region size of 400×400 pixels. In each row, there are three tampered images from
one camera model, ordered from C1 to C16 from top left to bottom right. The colors on the maps are coded as the
following: green - true positives; blue - false negatives; red - false positives; black - true negatives. Only one threshold
value was picked per each camera model as explained in Section 6 for Fusion method. Except for images from C10,
images are cropped for better visualization.
exceptions where the Fusion method performed consistently worse for a few cameras: C8 (Samsung Galaxy S3) and
C10 (Apple iPad).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a new technique for forgery detection, by using both of the model-specific and the device-
specific features of a camera to achieve better small-scale tamper detection performance. To reach this goal, a CNN
classifier for CMI and the traditional PRNU based SCV method were combined via a Neural Network. We call this
the Fusion method.
We first study how much the proposed Fusion approach improves detection of forgeries over traditional methods and
compared it against both CNN based CMI and PRNU based SCV methods. We found that Fusion performed better
than both CNN based CMI (up to 10%), and PRNU based SCV (up to 10%) in detecting tampering using blocks
originating from a different camera.
We also show that the CNN and NN models trained for the Fusion with specific camera models can be re-used for
localization of forgeries on a tampered image captured with a new device from the same camera model. Furthermore,
the robustness of the Fusion approach and its underlying detectors was compared. We found that the robustness
of Fusion was better than the underlying methods.We believe that, training a CNN model with the knowledge of
compression can increase the performance Fusion even further in such settings.
To complete the study, the proposed Fusion approach was compared against other PRNU-based enhanced forgery
detection methods in the literature. Results with the proposed method were better in locating forgeries, where, on
average, Fusion had 0.50, MSF had 0.44, and MRF had 0.35 in terms of F-scores for all tampered region sizes.
Similarly, Fusion performed best on the smallest tampered region size we tested (100×100 pixels), where it performed
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Figure 7: Examples with tampered region size of 200×200 pixels. In each row, there are three tampered images from
one camera model, ordered from C1 to C16 from top left to bottom right. The colors on the maps are coded as the
following: green - true positives; blue - false negatives; red - false positives; black - true negatives. Only one threshold
value was picked per each camera model as explained in Section 6 for Fusion method. Except for images from C10,
images are cropped for better visualization.
92% better than MRF, and 39% than MSF. However, the performance of the proposed method w.r.t. other methods was
found slightly poorer on larger tampered regions. The analysis window size of the proposed method can be adjusted
to accommodate for larger tampered regions for such cases.
For future work, we will evaluate employing multi-scale strategies and compression aware deep networks to further
improve the detection rates for forgeries of various size.
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